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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
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3	UNITED STATES	OF AMERICA,	
4	v.		13 CR 211 (NRB)
5	RAJARENGAN RAJARATNAM,		
6	Defendant.		
7		х	
8			New York, N.Y. July 8, 2014
9			9:19 a.m.
10	Before:		
11	HON. NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD, District Judge		
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14	APPEARANCES		
15	PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York CHRISTOPHER D. FREY		
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17	RANDALL W. JACKSON Assistant United States Attorneys		
18	LANKLER SIFFERT & WOHL LLP		
19	Attorneys for Defendant BY: DAN M. GITNER MICHAEL D. LONGYEAR DEREK CHAN		
20			
21	ALSO PRESENT: S	Special Agent Samuel	_ Moon
22	Ruby Hernandez, Paralegal Tea Saiti, Paralegal		
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1 (Trial resumed)

(Jury not present)

THE COURT: Good morning. Some of you didn't sleep last night. Okay. I have the letters.

So let me say that prior to receiving the government's letter with respect to the Palecek communications issue that I was not planning on giving an instruction on that.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: On the trading issue, Mr. Gitner, if you want to respond, that's fine.

Everyone can sit as far as I'm concerned. Don't have as much of an audience for my charge as you guys did.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, before Mr. Gitner responds, can I just put one more fact into the discussion so he can appropriately respond to it. I didn't have access to the underlying trading records at the time, but I just want to point out I had an opportunity to look at them this morning. The buy that is referenced in the chart is at approximately \$14. The sale is approximately 15. We're talking about a profit being made on this hundred thousand shares. I think it just further underscores some of the points we're talking about. But I just wanted to add that additional fact, two different prices.

MR. GITNER: I don't think underscores anything other than that they sold and bought at different times. The stock

prices go up and down over time.

Our point -- my point on summation was very simple.

His position remains unchanged. And the government, there was a Government Exhibit talked about all of Raj's different codes, TMT, TAM -- I can't remember all of them. Here it is, Government Exhibit 13. Our point was very simple, that on March 26, Raj's position, his position remained unchanged. Whether he went up and down by buying and selling quickly doing a day trade is immaterial to the argument. It's immaterial to the point, frankly, that even the government was trying to make. The point is that his position remained unchanged.

And when Mr. Frey got up and said that what I said was false, he took the extraordinary step of saying what Mr. Gitner said was false, that was misleading because in fact, in fact, it was not. In fact, the position remained unchanged.

All I want to do in the curative instruction is remind the jury what the trading records actually say. I tried to make it balanced. I'm looking for my letter. I tried to use a balanced instruction. If the Court doesn't want to say, to point out that what the government said was incomplete, I'm fine with that. My point is not to have sort of a surrebuttal through limiting instruction, what they said was wrong, what he said was right.

My point is just so that the jury has in front of it the correct records because I think it's almost impossible for

somebody without spending a lot of time and having a significant education in how to read these records to read them. I know the documents can be before the jury and maybe I think there's somebody who's a quant on the jury, maybe he can do it, but it is really hard to go through them. And it's not fair for the last thing they hear about what happened on March 26, such an important day, to be that Raj sold when in fact his net position remained unchanged. So all I want is for that fact to be clear.

MR. JACKSON: All I want is to be adopted by like a billionaire, but that's not relevant to the question of whether or not anything that Mr. Frey said was false.

Nothing Mr. Frey said was false. You don't get a curative instruction just because you'd like the jury to focus specifically on something else that you want to look at. And it does matter to the argument that Mr. Gitner made because if we look at what he actually said, he says, who sells stock at under \$17 if you know it's going to 17 bucks a share. People playing the market like everyone else. That's who.

But what actually happened on March 26 is that Raj buys at 14 and sells at 15, netting himself a hundred thousand dollar profit. So if that is the case, why was Raj selling? The bottom line being Raj sold on that day. And the most important point is what Mr. Frey said was literally accurate. What Mr. Gitner said was literally inaccurate. And so it's up

to the jury to look at whatever records they want that are appropriate.

But we're having a completely different discussion when we start -- let me just finish -- we're having a completely different discussion when we're talking about whether or not there should be a curative instruction. There should only be a curative instruction if there was something Mr. Frey said that was false, and he has not been able to point to one thing that he said that was false.

MR. GITNER: Let me do that. "Raj's position did not in fact remain unchanged." That's what he said.

MR. JACKSON: Accurate. When you buy --

MR. GITNER: Let me finish please, sir.

MR. JACKSON: That's not remaining unchanged.

MR. GITNER: The point is at the end of the day -this is rebuttal summation, remember that -- my point was that
at the end of the day his position remained unchanged. That's
true. That's true. And it's untrue that his position did not
remain unchanged.

And also we don't know if Raj bought or sold first.

The timing of whether he bought or sold first is not in evidence, and I don't think it's frankly findable based on the OMS records. It's impossible to know if he bought or sold first. All we know is that he bought and sold and made a profit. It's unclear what Raj's motives were there. And all

I'm asking for is that the facts be clear because they're not right now based on what Mr. Frey said.

THE COURT: Look, I think I'm not inclined to give this curative instruction because had the defense summation ended with Raj's position remained unchanged, period, Mr. Frey could not have said what he did, but it didn't end that way. There were two references to Raj not selling. I don't think that calling it false is appropriate.

But I think that if the jury gets into this issue in a granular way, I would expect that we would receive a note from them. If we receive such a note, they're going to get the complete story. But I think that if they are that curious on this issue, and if you're correct that there is nothing, no exhibit that they could easily discern what actually happened on March 26, they would ask us a question about it and at that point they will learn that there was one trade that was a buy, one trade that was a sell, that it was at the end of the day Raj's funds were in the same numerical position as at the beginning of the day.

I don't think I would be inclined to tell them about the prices because of the fact that we don't know what the order of the trades was in and the pricing would matter much more depending on the order, what was first, what was the buy, what was the sell. If we don't know that, I think there's a limited argument, a limited good argument that can be made from

that.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, we think the Court's ruling is entirely appropriate. We think it's appropriate to point the jury, if we get to that granular point you're describing, whatever evidence will aid that. I'll note when we get to that point, I think we may have a slightly different view of the evidence. There is some information in the evidence that is in evidence about timing of some of those transactions. But that's not a discussion that we need to address right now. We'll have the appropriate, if that comes up, that's an appropriate thing we can figure out.

MR. GITNER: That's fine. I'm confident that the evidence that's in evidence does not address the timing of when the trades were actually made, just when they were booked. I have no doubts about that, actually, but we can address that later.

THE COURT: All right. Let me say one of the reasons we're slightly delayed in coming down is that I had the joy of rereading the charge on the train coming in this morning and just noticed a couple of very small things. But let me just tell you if I remember now what they were.

One on page, I think it's still page 10, with respect to the transcripts, I've made it clear that they are getting, instead of the transcripts, they're getting a computer with the tapes on them.

In terms of charts and summaries, we've taken out references to either charts or summaries being based on testimony since they aren't.

There's a reference at the end -- there was a sentence that said if you want to see any of the exhibits that you don't have, you can come back to court. There are no drugs and there are no guns here so it's irrelevant. It just was a line I took out.

We took out the reference to character evidence because there was none.

And as we had discussed, we edited the limiting instruction pursuant to our conversation yesterday.

I think that covers anything that we did between Thursday and now.

MR. GITNER: Your Honor, I have a brief request. Just looking at it this morning, on page 16, in the uncalled witnesses charge, there's a sentence, just getting into it, you should not draw any inferences or reach any conclusions about what these uncalled witnesses would have testified to had they been called. The next sentence concerns my request. It says, their absence should not affect your judgment in any way.

I actually think that sentence should be deleted. I think that I'm allowed to argue lack of evidence and that can affect their judgment. And so I think the point of this is that they shouldn't draw inferences about what someone would or

wouldn't say. But the point of the charge, I think, is not that whether their absence should affect their judgment. I think I'm allowed to argue on the evidence or lack of evidence, and this sentence I think is contrary to that.

So I'd ask that this sentence be deleted. I don't think it affects the main thrust of the charge.

THE COURT: Well, you did bring up the point that the government failed to call any Galleon witness. That was in your --

MR. GITNER: Yes.

THE COURT: -- summation yesterday.

MR. GITNER: Yes.

THE COURT: The government, to balance it, there is the investigative techniques charge, which --

MR. GITNER: The charge is actually quite balanced that they don't need to do anything. But I think this particular sentence is not quite right. So I'm asking this sentence be deleted.

THE COURT: What he says makes sense to me.

MR. JACKSON: Can we just have a moment, your Honor.

Your Honor, we're fine with taking it out.

MR. GITNER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Elena reminds me that the defendant decided not to request a description of the defense.

MR. GITNER: Yes.

THE COURT: We just added the kind of standard sentence at the top of 18 that the defendant denies the charge against him and contends that the government has failed to prove this charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

MR. GITNER: Thank you, Judge. Is that from the standard? It sounds standard. I'm just wondering.

THE COURT: Elena specifically found that in Judge Gardephe's charge and somebody else's. Judge Sullivan.

MR. GITNER: Good enough for me. Thank you.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, just one small thing that we noticed this morning. On page 26 of the charge, your Honor makes reference -- I'm actually not sure it's current page 26.

THE COURT: Just tell me what the paragraph begins with.

MR. JACKSON: Absolutely, Judge. It's paragraph that talks about essential element of the crime is intent.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JACKSON: It says, it follows that good faith on the part of the defendant is a complete defense to a charge of securities fraud. That's the first time the term securities fraud is used in the charge. Your charge makes clear that it's the securities laws. We just thought that the fix for that, just so there's no confusion —

THE COURT: Fine.

MR. JACKSON: -- would be when your Honor is

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THE COURT: Why don't we just change it.

MR. GITNER: Change it to charge, is a complete defense to the charge, period.

THE COURT: Works.

MR. JACKSON: I think that that would be potentially fine, but I think it would be -- I personally think it would be more accurate to just where your Honor says insider trading and conspiracy to engage in insider trading the first time, just say, comma, which is a form of securities fraud.

THE COURT: I am not charging that.

MR. JACKSON: That's fine, Judge.

MR. GITNER: Thank you, Judge. So we would just say good faith on the part of the defendant is a complete defense to --

THE COURT: -- this charge.

MR. GITNER: -- this charge. I think that works. Thank you.

THE COURT: I guess we can bring the jury in now.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.

Ladies and gentlemen, my duty at this point is to instruct you as to the law. I will endeavor to be as clear as possible. It is your duty to accept these instructions of law as I give them to you and apply them to the facts as you

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determine them. I know that you will try the issues that have been presented to you according to the oath which you have taken as jurors in which you promised that you would well and truly try the issues in this case and render a true verdict.

You should not single out any instruction as alone stating the law, but you should consider my instructions as a whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room. To that end, you will all be permitted to take a copy of these instructions with you into the jury room.

You, the members of the jury, are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You pass upon the weight of the evidence; you determine the credibility of the witnesses; you resolve any conflicts in the testimony; and you draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide to draw from the facts as you have determined them.

By the way, let me just say to the people in the audience that if you choose to stay for the charge, you must stay until the end. You cannot get up and down, so, okay.

The defendant in this case, Rengan Rajaratnam, entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment. As I told you before, the law presumes the defendant to be innocent of the charges against him. I therefore instruct you that the defendant is to be presumed by you to be innocent throughout your deliberations until such time, if ever, you as a jury are satisfied that the government has proven him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The burden is on the prosecution to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element of the offense charged. The burden of proof never shifts to a defendant in a criminal case, and the law never imposes on a defendant the obligation of doing anything in a criminal trial. Nor does the law impose on a defendant the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to require an acquittal of the defendant unless and until, after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you, as jurors, unanimously are convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The question naturally comes up is what is a reasonable doubt? The words almost define themselves. It is a doubt founded in reason and arising out of the evidence in the case or the lack of evidence. It is a doubt that a reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must therefore be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.

The law does not require that the government prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict. Reasonable doubt is a doubt that appeals to your reason, your judgment, your experience,

your common sense. It is not caprice, whim, or speculation.

It is not an excuse to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty. It is not sympathy for the defendant.

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If, after fair, impartial, and careful consideration of all the evidence, you can candidly and honestly say that you are not satisfied of the guilt of the defendant, that is, if you have such a doubt as would cause you, as a prudent person, to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to yourself, then you have a reasonable doubt, and in that circumstance it is your duty to acquit.

On the other hand, if, after a fair, impartial, and careful consideration of all the evidence, you can candidly and honestly say that you are satisfied of the guilt of the defendant and that you do not have a doubt that would prevent you from acting in important matters in the personal affairs of your own life, then you have no reasonable doubt, and under such circumstances you should convict.

The evidence before you consists of the answers given by witnesses -- the testimony they gave, as you recall it -- the exhibits that were received in evidence, and the stipulations entered into by the parties.

As I indicated to you at the beginning of the trial, certain things are not evidence and must not be considered by you in your deliberations.

First, the exhibits marked for identification but not

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received may not be considered by you as evidence.

Second, what lawyers say in their opening statements, in closing arguments, or in objections is not evidence. Similarly, you should bear in mind that a question put to a witness is never evidence. It is only the answer that is evidence. Be mindful that it is the duty of the attorney for each side of a case to object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence that the attorney believes is not properly admissible. Nor is anything I may have said during the trial or may say during these instructions with respect to a matter of fact to be taken in substitution for your own independent recollection, nor should you consider anything that I have said or may say as indicating that I have an opinion as to what your verdict should be. However, testimony that the Court has excluded or told you to disregard is not evidence and must not be considered. If you are instructed that some item of evidence is received for a limited purpose only, you must follow that instruction.

Third, anything that you have heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must be disregarded. You are to decide the case solely on the evidence presented here in the courtroom.

Fourth, any notes that you may take are not evidence. Your notes may be used solely to assist you and are not to substitute for your recollection of the evidence in the case.

The fact that a particular juror has taken notes does not entitle that juror's views to any greater weight than those of any other juror.

A word about stipulations. In this case, you have heard evidence in the form of stipulations that contain facts that were agreed to be true. You must accept those facts as true.

In this case, you also heard evidence in the form of stipulations of testimony. A stipulation of testimony is an agreement among the parties that, if called, a witness would have given certain testimony. You are to treat stipulated testimony just as if the witness actually appeared in court. It is for you to determine the effect to be given that testimony.

There are two types of evidence that you may properly use in reaching your verdict.

One type of evidence is direct evidence. Direct evidence is when a witness testifies about something he knows by virtue of his own senses — something he has seen, felt, touched, or heard. Direct evidence may also be in the form of an exhibit where the fact to be proved is its present existence or condition.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence that tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other facts. There is a simple example of circumstantial evidence that is often used in

this courthouse.

Assume that when you came into the courthouse this morning the sun was shining and it was a nice day. Assume that the courtroom blinds were drawn and you could not look outside. As you were sitting here, someone walked in with an umbrella that was dripping wet. Then a few moments later another person also entered with a wet umbrella. Now, you can not look outside of the courtroom and you can not see whether or not it is raining, so you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of facts that I have asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it had been raining.

That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of reason, experience, and common sense from one established fact the existence or nonexistence of some other fact.

Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence. You may consider both in reaching your conclusion as to whether the government has proven its case against the defendant.

Many material facts -- such as state of mind -- are rarely susceptible of proof by direct evidence. Such facts may be established by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that you draw.

During the trial you have heard the attorneys use the

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term "inference," and in their arguments they have asked you to infer by using your reason, experience, and common sense, the existence of some fact from one or more established facts. An inference is not a suspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical decision to conclude that the disputed fact exists on the basis of another fact that you know exists. In drawing inferences, you should use your common sense. There are times when different inferences may be drawn from facts, whether proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The government asks you to draw one set of inferences while the defense attorneys ask you to draw another. Whether or not to draw a particular inference is, of course, a matter exclusively for you to determine, as are all determinations of fact.

You have heard testimony about and seen evidence derived from telephone calls which were tape recorded without the knowledge of the defendant and others, but with the consent and authorization of the Court. All of this evidence was lawfully obtained and properly admitted in this case and may properly be considered.

In connection with these tapes, the parties have been permitted to display transcripts of the recordings. These documents were shown to you as an aid or guide to you in listening to the recordings. However, they are not in and of themselves evidence, and therefore may not be considered by you during your deliberations. However, you will be provided with

a computer on which you may play the tapes which have been admitted into evidence.

During the trial, you have heard argument by counsel that the government did not utilize specific investigative techniques. There is no legal requirement that the government use any specific investigative techniques to prove its case. Your concern, as I have said, is to determine whether or not, on the evidence or lack of evidence, the defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

You have been presented with exhibits in the form of charts and summaries. These exhibits purport to summarize the underlying evidence that was used to propose them and were shown to you to make the other evidence more meaningful and to aid you in considering the evidence. They are no better than the documents upon which they are based and are not themselves independent evidence. Therefore, you are to give no greater weight to these charts and summaries than you would give to the evidence on which they are based.

It is for you to decide whether the charts an summaries correctly present the information contained in the documents on which they were based. In the event that a chart or summary differs from the actual documents on which the chart or summary is based, you are to rely on the actual document and not the chart or summary. You are entitled to consider the charts and summaries if you find that they are of assistance to

you in analyzing and understanding the evidence.

You have had an opportunity to observe all of the witnesses. It is now your job to decide how believable each witness was in his testimony. You are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness and of the importance of his testimony.

Your decision whether to believe a witness may depend on how that witness impressed you. Was the witness candid, frank, and forthright? Or did the witness seem as if he was hiding something, being evasive, or suspect in some way? How did the way the witness testified on direct examination compare with how the witness testified on cross-examination? Was the witness consistent in his testimony or did he contradict himself? Did the witness appear to know what he was talking about, and did the witness strike you as someone who was trying to report his knowledge accurately?

How much you choose to believe a witness may be influenced by the witness's bias. Does the witness have a relationship with the government or the defendant that may affect how he testified? Does the witness have some incentive, loyalty, or motive that might cause him to shade the truth or does the witness have some bias, prejudice, or hostility that may have caused the witness — consciously or not — to give you something other than a completely accurate account of the facts he testified to?

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Even if the witness was impartial, you should consider whether the witness had an opportunity to observe the facts he testified about. Also ask yourselves whether the witness's recollection of the facts stands up in light of all the other evidence.

A witness may be inaccurate, contradictory or even untruthful in some respects and yet may be entirely credible in the essence of his testimony. It is for you to say whether his testimony in this trial is truthful or not in whole or in part, in light of his demeanor, statements, and all of the evidence.

Additionally, the fact that the prosecution is brought in the name of the United States of America entitles the government to no greater or no less consideration than that accorded to any other party in the litigation. All parties, whether the government or individuals, stand as equals under the law.

You have heard testimony from government witnesses who have pleaded guilty to the same or similar charges. You are instructed, however, that you are to draw no conclusions or inferences of any kind about the guilt of the defendant merely from the fact that a witness for the prosecution or a coconspirator pleaded guilty to the same or similar charges. The decisions of those individuals to plead guilty were personal decisions about their own guilt and may not be used by you in any way to infer the defendant's guilt.

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You have heard the testimony of law enforcement officers and of employees of the government. The fact that a witness may be employed as a law enforcement officer or government employee does not mean that his testimony is necessarily deserving of more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of an ordinary witness. It is your decision, after reviewing all the evidence, whether to accept the testimony of the law enforcement witness and to give that testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves.

You have heard evidence during the trial that witnesses have discussed the facts of the case and their testimony with the lawyers before the witnesses appeared in court. Although you may consider that fact when you are evaluating a witness's credibility, I should tell you that there is nothing either unusual or improper about a witness meeting with lawyers before testifying so that the witness can be aware of the subjects he will be questioned about, focus on those subjects, and have the opportunity to review relevant exhibits before being questioned about them. Such consultation helps conserve your time and the Court's time. In fact, it would be unusual for a lawyer to call a witness without such consultation.

Again, the weight you give to the fact or the nature of the witness's preparation for his testimony and what inference you draw from such preparation are matters completely

within your discretion.

Constitution, a defendant has no obligation to testify or present any evidence because it is the prosecution's burden to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As I stated earlier, the burden remains with the prosecution throughout the entire trial and never shifts to the defendant. A defendant is never required to prove that he is innocent. The right of a defendant not to testify is an important part of our Constitution. It is for that reason that you may not attach any significance to the fact that the defendant did not testify. No adverse inference may be drawn against the defendant because he did not take the witness stand. You may not consider this against the defendant in any way in your deliberations.

There are people whose names you heard during the course of the trial who did not appear and testify. The government is not required to prove its case through any particular witnesses. Nor does the defendant have any burden or duty to call any witnesses or produce any evidence. You should not draw any inferences or reach any conclusions about what these uncalled witnesses would have testified to had they been called. Again, your concern is to determine whether, on the evidence that has been admitted or the lack thereof, the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Further, you are not being asked whether any person other than the defendant here on trial has been proven guilty. In that vein, you may not draw any inference, favorable or unfavorable, toward the government or the defendant, from the fact that certain persons are not on trial in this case. You may not speculate as to why other people are not on trial before you now.

Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence developed at trial or the lack of evidence. It would be improper for you to consider, in reaching your decision as to whether the government sustained its burden of proof, any personal feelings you may have about the defendant's or witness's race, religion, national origin, sex or age. The parties in this case are entitled to a trial free from prejudice, and our judicial system cannot work unless you reach your verdict through a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.

Your verdict may be based exclusively on the evidence or lack of evidence in the case, for once you let fear or prejudice, bias, or sympathy interfere with your thinking, there is a risk that you will not arrive at a just and true verdict.

With these preliminary instructions in mind, let us now turn to instructions of law.

The indictment charges the defendant, Rengan

Rajaratnam, with conspiring to violate the securities laws by engaging in what is referred to as insider trading. The defendant denies the charge against him and contends that the government has failed to prove this charge beyond a reasonable doubt. As I instructed you at the outset of this case, the indictment is a charge or accusation. It is not evidence, and it is not to be considered by you as any evidence of the guilt of the defendant.

A conspiracy is a kind of criminal partnership -- an agreement of two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose.

Here, the conspiracy charged is alleged to be an agreement in 2008 between Rengan Rajaratnam and his brother Raj Rajaratnam and others known and unknown to violate the securities laws of the United States by engaging in insider trading.

The actual commission of a substantive crime is not an essential element of the crime of conspiracy. Rather, the coconspirators must simply have agreed to commit a scheme that, if carried out, would have met all the requirements of the crime of insider trading, as I will define it for you. Indeed, you may find the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy even if you find that the charged conspiracy was not successful and no insider trading was ever actually committed.

I will now instruct you about the elements of the

conspiracy offense.

To sustain its burden of proof on the charge of conspiracy, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, the existence of the conspiracy charged in the indictment; that is, an agreement or understanding among at least two people to commit insider trading.

Second, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly became a member of the conspiracy, with intent to further its illegal purpose.

Third, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the coconspirators — not necessarily the defendant — knowingly committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Now let us separately consider these elements.

As I just indicated, the first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the offense of conspiracy is that two or more persons entered into the unlawful agreement alleged in the indictment. In other words, the government must prove that there is in fact — excuse me. Let me just say that again. In other words, the government must prove that there in fact was an agreement or understanding to violate those provisions of the law which make it unlawful to engage in insider trading. The first element of the crime of conspiracy thus has two parts: one, the unlawful

agreement; and, two, the object of the conspiracy.

Now, the government is not required to show that two or more people sat around a table and entered into a solemn pact, orally or in writing, stating that they had formed a conspiracy to violate the law and spelling out all the details. Common sense tells you that when people in fact agree to enter into a criminal conspiracy, much is left to the unexpressed understanding. It is rare this a conspiracy can be proven by direct evidence of an explicit agreement.

In order to show that a conspiracy existed, the evidence must show that two or more people, in some way or manner, through any contrivance, explicitly or implicitly, that is, spoken or unspoken, came to a mutual understanding to violate the law and to accomplish an unlawful plan.

When people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, they became agents or partners of one another in carrying out the conspiracy. In determining whether there has been an unlawful agreement as alleged, you may consider the acts and conduct of the alleged coconspirators that were done to carry out the apparent criminal purpose. In addition, in determining whether such an agreement existed, you may consider direct as well as circumstantial evidence. The old adage, "actions speak louder than words," applies here. Often, the only evidence that is available with respect to the existence or nonexistence of the conspiracy is that of disconnected acts

and conduct on the part of the alleged coconspirators. When taken all together and considered as a whole, however, those acts and conduct may warrant the inference that a conspiracy existed or did not exist as conclusively as would direct proof. On this question, you should refer back to my earlier instructions on direct and circumstantial evidence and inferences.

So you must first determine whether the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. It is sufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracy, as I've said -- as I have already said, if, from the proof of all the relevant facts and circumstances, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of Rengan Rajaratnam and at least one other alleged coconspirator met to accomplish, by the means alleged, the objectives of the conspiracy. In this case, the government alleges that there was a meeting of the minds between Rengan Rajaratnam and Raj Rajaratnam.

The second part of the first element relates to the object, or objective, of the conspiracy — some illegal goal that the members of the conspiracy agree they will try to accomplish. The conspiracy charged has as its object a scheme to engage in insider trading.

In order to establish the object of the conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that two or

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more coconspirators agreed to obtain, in or about 2008, material nonpublic information from one or more companies for the purpose of trading on the companies' stock, knowing that the information had been obtained from an insider who had provided the information in violation of that insider's duty of trust and confidence and in exchange for or in anticipation of a person benefit.

An "insider" is one who comes into possession of material, nonpublic information about a specific security or stock by virtue of a relationship that involves trust and confidence. Such a relationship can, for example, arise out of a person's employment relationship with a company, or out of a client relationship, or out of a relationship as a board member to a company. The law forbids an insider, who is expected to keep certain information confidential, from trading in the securities in question or assisting others to trade in securities on the basis of that information.

The law also prohibits a person who is not actually an insider from trading in securities based on material, nonpublic information, if the person, who is known as a tippee, knowingly received material, nonpublic information from other individuals and wrongfully used it for his own benefit when he knew that the inside information had been disclosed in violation of a duty of trust or confidence and in exchange, directly or indirectly, for a personal benefit. The benefit may be, but

need not be, financial or tangible in nature. It could include, for example, obtaining a useful networking contact, enhancing a witness's reputation or power, obtaining future financial benefits, or maintaining or furthering a friendship.

Information is nonpublic if it was not available to the public or authorized to be disclosed to the public through such sources as press releases, Securities and Exchange Commission filings, trade publications, analyst reports, newspapers, magazines, television, radio, word of mouth, or in response to requests. The confirmation by an insider of unconfirmed facts or rumors may itself be inside information. However, the law permits analysts and portfolio managers to meet and speak with corporate officers and other insiders, as well as experts affiliated with such companies, in order to ferret out and analyze information useful in making investment decisions.

Information is "material" if a reasonable investor would have considered it significant in deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold securities, and at what price to buy or sell securities.

An insider trading scheme involves the use of the material, nonpublic information in connection with a stock purchase or sale of securities — in other words, the information would be at least a factor in the decision to buy or sell. An insider trading scheme must also involve the use

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of an instrumentality of interstate commerce, in other words, the mails, telephone, wire, or any device or facility that can be used to transmit information or communications across state borders, or of a national securities exchange, such as, for example, the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ, in furtherance of the scheme. This might include placing a telephone call or placing an order with a trader or a brokerage firm to buy or sell a security on a national exchange.

If you conclude that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged conspiracy existed and that the conspiracy had as its object the illegal purpose charged in the indictment, then you must next determine whether Rengan Rajaratnam joined in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purpose and in furtherance of its unlawful objective. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rengan Rajaratnam unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally became a member of the charged conspiracy.

"Knowingly" means to act voluntarily and deliberately, rather than mistakenly or inadvertently. "Intentionally" means to act deliberately and with a bad purpose, rather than innocently, and to act with an intent to defraud and thereby harm the company from which the inside information was obtained.

The question of the defendant's intent is a question of fact that you are called upon to decide, just as you

determine any other fact at issue. A person's intent involves the state of his mind and the purpose with which he acted at the time of the -- start that again. A person's intent involves the state of his mind and purpose with which he acted at the time the acts in question occurred. Direct proof of knowledge and intent is almost never available, and it is not required to find that such proof exists. It would be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that

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Knowledge and criminal intent, though subjective, may be established by circumstantial evidence, based on a person's outward manifestations, his words, his conduct, his acts, and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom.

as of a given time in the past he had committed an act with

fraudulent intent. Such direct proof is not required.

Since an essential element of the crime charged is intent to defraud, it follows that good faith on the part of the defendant is a complete defense to this charge. It is for you to decide whether the defendant acted in good faith or not. If you decide that the defendant at all relevant times acted in good faith, it is your duty to acquit him. The law is not violated if the defendant acted in good faith and held an honest belief that his actions were proper and not in furtherance of any illegal venture. In this respect, I would remind you that the defendant has no burden to establish the

defense of good faith, however. The burden is on the government to prove criminal intent and consequent lack of good faith beyond a reasonable doubt.

I want to caution you that mere knowledge or acquiescence, without participation, in the unlawful plan is not sufficient. Moreover, the fact that the acts of a defendant, without knowledge, merely happen to further the purposes or objectives of the conspiracy, does not make the defendant a member. What is necessary is that the defendant must have participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful objective and with the intention of aiding in the accomplishment of that objective.

It is for important for you to note that a defendant's participation in the conspiracy must be established by evidence of his own acts or statements. However, you may consider the defendant's acts and statements in the context of the acts and statements of the alleged other conspirators, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.

To become a member of the conspiracy, the defendant need not have known the identifies of each and every other member, nor need he have been apprised of all their activities. In fact, a defendant may know only one other member of the conspiracy and still be a coconspirator. Moreover, the defendant need not have been fully informed as to all of the details, or the scope, of the conspiracy in order justify an

inference of knowledge on his part.

Nor is it necessary that the defendant receive any monetary benefit from participating in the conspiracy. While proof of a financial interest in the outcome of a conspiracy is not essential, if you find that the defendant had such an interest, that determination is a factor which you may properly consider in determining whether or not the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.

If you determine that the defendant became a member of the conspiracy, the extent of his participation in that conspiracy has no bearing on the issue of his guilt. A conspirator's liability is not measured by the extent or duration of his participation. Indeed, each member may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times. Some coconspirator — I'm sorry. Some conspirators play major roles, while others play minor roles in the scheme. An equal role is not what the law requires. In fact, even a single act may be sufficient to draw the defendant within the ambit of the conspiracy.

I want to caution you, however, that a defendant's mere association with one or more members of the conspiracy does not automatically make the defendant a member himself. A person may know, be friendly with, be a colleague of, or be related to a criminal without being a criminal himself. Mere similarity of conduct or the fact that they may have assembled

together and discussed common aims and interests does not necessarily establish membership in a conspiracy.

It is not required that the government show that the defendant, in addition to knowing what he was doing and deliberately doing it, also knew that he was violating some particular federal statute. But to meet its burden, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the intent to help carry out some essential step in the execution of the scheme to defraud that is alleged in the indictment.

The third element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that at least one of the conspirators — not necessarily the defendant — committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, during the time that the conspiracy was in existence. The overt act element is a requirement that the agreement went beyond the mere talking stage, the mere agreement stage.

This burden may be met by the government showing that Rengan Rajaratnam or one of his coconspirators knowingly and willfully committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. This is because such an act becomes, in the eyes of the law, the act of all the members of the conspiracy.

However, you must all agree on at least one overt act that a conspirator committed in order to satisfy this element.

In other words, it is not sufficient for you to agree that some

overt act was committed without agreeing on which overt act was committed.

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You should bear in mind that the overt act, standing alone, may be an innocent, lawful act. You are therefore instructed that the overt act does not have to be an act which in and of itself is criminal or constitutes an objective of the conspiracy.

Finally, in considering whether the government has proven the charged conspiracy and whether the government has proven the defendant's participation in the charged conspiracy, you may not rely on evidence of the defendant's trades in Clearwire securities, but you may consider other evidence related to Clearwire in deciding whether the government has proven the charged conspiracy and the defendant's participation in the charged conspiracy.

As I mentioned to you throughout this trial, you have heard references to companies other than Clearwire and AMD on some of the wiretapped phone calls. These references included Cisco, EMC, and other companies. This evidence was not introduced to show that the defendant engaged in insider trading in those stocks and there is no evidence that he did.

Now, in addition to dealing with the elements of the conspiracy, you must also consider the issue of venue, namely, whether any act in furtherance of the unlawful activity occurred within the Southern District of New York. The

Southern District of New York encompasses Manhattan, the Bronx, Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, Orange, and Sullivan County. So, anything that occurs in those counties occurs in the Southern District of New York.

In this regard, the government need not prove that the crime itself was committed in this district or that the defendant himself was present here. It is sufficient to satisfy this element if any act in furtherance of the crime occurred within this district. Such an act would include, for example, the placing of a telephone call to or from the Southern District of New York or the execution or settlement of a securities trade within this district.

I note that on this issue, and this issue alone, the government need not offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that it is sufficient if the government proves venue by a mere preponderance of the evidence. A preponderance of the evidence means to prove that the fact is more likely than not true. Thus, the government has satisfied its venue obligations if you conclude that it is more likely than not that any act in furtherance of the crime you are considering occurred within the Southern District of New York.

The government, to prevail, must prove each essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. To report a verdict, it must be unanimous.

Each juror is entitled to his or her opinion; each

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should, however, exchange views with his or her fellow jurors. That is the very purpose of jury deliberation — to discuss and consider the evidence; to listen to the arguments of fellow jurors; to present your individual views; to consult with one another; and to reach an agreement based solely and wholly on the evidence — if you can do so without violence to your own individual judgment.

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, after consideration with your fellow jurors of the evidence in the case. But you should not hesitate to change an opinion which, after discussion with your fellow jurors, appears erroneous.

However, if, after carefully considering all the evidence and the arguments of your fellow jurors, you entertain a conscientious view that differs from the others, you are not to yield your conviction simply because you are outnumbered.

Your final vote must reflect your conscientious conviction as to how the issues should be decided.

I want to say a word about punishment and sentencing. The question of possible punishment of the defendant is of no concern to the jury and should not, in any sense, enter into or influence your deliberations. The duty of imposing sentence rests exclusively with the Court. Your function is to weigh the evidence in the case and to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of such evidence. Under your oath as jurors, you cannot

allow a consideration of the punishment which may be imposed upon the defendant, if convicted, to influence your verdict in any way or in any sense enter into your deliberations.

Now that I have charged you as to what the law is, you are about to go into the jury room and begin your deliberations. I am going to have the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence brought to you in the jury room. If you want to review any of the testimony, that can also be done if you send us a note. But, please remember that it is not always easy to locate what you might want, so be as specific as you possibly can in requesting portions of the testimony that you may want.

I will also give you a copy of -- a number of copies of this charge on the law for use during your deliberations.

If you feel that you need any of the legal principles clarified during your deliberations, I will be happy to do so.

Your requests for testimony or for additional instructions on the law -- in fact, any communication with the Court -- should be made to me in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to one of the court officers. I will respond to any questions or requests that you have as promptly as possible, either in writing or by having you return to the courtroom so I can speak with you in person. In any event, do not tell me or anyone else how the jury stands on the issue of the defendant's guilt until after a unanimous verdict is

reached.

At this time I want to tell you that juror No. 1, Isabel Tirado, will serve as the jury's foreperson. The foreperson will be responsible for signing all communications to the Court on behalf of the jury and for handing them to the marshal during your deliberations. This should not be understood to mean that an individual cannot send the Court a note should the foreperson refuse to do so. After you have reached a verdict, your foreperson will advise the officer outside your door that you are ready to return to the courtroom.

I will stress once again that each of you should be in agreement with the verdict that is announced in court. Once your verdict is announced by your foreperson in open court and officially recorded, it cannot ordinarily be revoked.

The custom and tradition in this court requires, although I know it is totally unnecessary, that I admonish you to be polite and respectful towards each other in the course of your discussions in the jury room so that each juror will have his or her position made clear and so that when you reach a verdict you will know that it is a just one.

Finally, let me state that your oath sums up your duty and that is: without fear or favor to anyone, you will well and truly try the issues between the government and the defendant, based solely on the evidence and this Court's

instructions as to the law.

Let me ask counsel if there's anything we need to talk about on the charge.

MR. JACKSON: No, your Honor.

MR. GITNER: One moment, Judge.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. There are 13 of you left standing, but a jury can only be 12. So at this time I'm going to inform Mr. Jones that you're actually the alternate. You are not, however, excused. You may leave, but you're not legally excused.

What that means is that should it happen, and occasionally it does, that during deliberations somehow we lose a juror, we will need to call you back in. So that means that the admonition that you can't talk about the case continues. We will, I promise, call you within, you know, 15 minutes of there being a verdict to let you know what it is and to let you know that you're really excused.

But before you go I want to thank you for your service. We talked a little bit about that Thursday. That's essentially what I say to all jurors. We very much appreciate your attention and your time and your taking the time out of your normal life to participate in this really special American tradition of jury service. And, again, on behalf of the entire court and the parties, we thank you.

So I think we have to swear in the marshal, the court officer.

(Marshal sworn)

THE COURT: So as I said, just practically, the exhibits are going to be brought to you, you're going to be given verdict forms, you already have note pads. There are, I understand, envelopes which you can put any note already in the jury room. You're going to get the scrubbed computer that only has the tapes that were admitted into evidence. Your snack should come on time. And I don't know if there are any other details at this point that we need to talk about.

So the moment, in a sense, that you've been waiting for to be able to talk is a moment away, but let Mr. Jones leave before you start to deliberate. You don't have to walk out. Just when you leave, before you guys talk, just say good-bye, say it was nice to meet you and let him go, okay.

We have cell phone for you, contact information, right, in case we need contact you, right, Mr. Jones?

JUROR: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Great. Thank you.

(Jury retired to deliberate; time noted: 10:30 a.m.)

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, just to clarify, and I'm sure when your clerks pass all the exhibits over they can explain this, but the scrubbed computer doesn't actually contain the recordings. The parties have assembled disks that

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have all the recordings, which are marked, and the computer can play all the recordings. It's of no moment. There's a password that's on the computer; it's pasted on there. It's very simple.

MR. GITNER: Before I discuss that, Judge, I didn't want to do it in front of the jury. I just want to repeat just for the record my -- I'll phrase them as exceptions. To the extent that I had made certain requests like multiple conspiracy charge, I think to make my record more perfect I need to repeat that now just to state that I have made those exceptions. I would request them again. I understand your Honor is denying them and is not going to do that.

I think we have, with regard to the tapes, I do think we've worked together and created a disk and index. I think we have one dispute about one item on the index that might make sense for the lawyers to talk about before this stuff goes back. And I think we just have to look at the paper exhibits, that shouldn't take long, and they can go back.

I think that was it. Your Honor, could we get a copy of the verdict sheet?

THE COURT: We gave it to you yesterday.

MR. GITNER: I think I saw it but I think in the confusion we -- I can't find it.

(Continued on next page)

1 MR. GITNER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Could I get clarification. Are the exhibits ready to go back?

MR. GITNER: They are. I think literally we need to put our eyes on it and then it can go back. One last thing, one thing. I know it's the government's computer that's been scrubbed, but I'm not sure where the speakers are. I actually thought they would come with better speakers than just the single computer. I'm not sure if the government then brought speakers for the computer.

MR. JACKSON: We can bring up some extra speakers if that will be helpful. I'll get them after we bring the computer in there, then we did use that. It will be simple. It will be easy to plug in. In fact, I assume as defense counsel is doing its duties, we can retrieve extra speakers.

MR. GITNER: Thank you. That's it.

I think we have to discuss something. There's one issue on the index that I think there was some disagreement over. We have to figure that out.

(Recess pending verdict)

(In open court; jury not present)

MR. JACKSON: We have a dispute because we removed, pursuant to your Honor's order regarding the Clearwire trades from the government exhibits, the chart which depicted Rengan Rajaratnam's personal trades in his Fidelity account. We took

that out. We also took out another related chart to that compensation.

What we do still have are two charts the defense objects to, Government Exhibits 24 and 25 which depict trading in Clearwire by certain Galleon portfolio manager codes from March 24 through April 21, 2008 and a second one depicts the realized profit or loss during that same time period.

Mr. Gitner's objection is that the very last entry on this chart is a 657 -- it's an almost negligible trade that occurred on 4/21, 2008, Mr. Gitner says that it's his belief that that's Rengan Rajaratnam's trade.

What we have said is, we don't think that there's any evidence in the record supporting that that's his trade and so these charts don't need to be altered in any way in order to go back to the jury.

However, we offer, if the defendant likes, we'd be willing to redact that trade from it and have the charts offered as redacted. But the defense is suggesting that the entirety of these charts needs to be removed when they have clearly been the subject of a lot of discussion at the trial, and I don't think they run afoul of your Honor's order in any way.

MR. GITNER: It's not quite my objection. I don't have a copy. If I can borrow it? We agree the charts mark 14, 26 and 27 are not going to go back pursuant to your Honor's

order. So what's at issue are Exhibits 24 and 25. Twenty-four is a chart that --

THE COURT: Which ones are not going back?

MR. GITNER: We have agreed that Government Exhibits 14, 26 and 27 are not going back.

What's at issue are 24 and 25. If it's okay, I'm going to talk about 25 first because I have it in front of me. This is the one that is realized profit or loss from trading in Clearwire, associated with certain Galleon portfolio manager codes from March 24 through April 21, 2008. And although it ends on April 21, 2008, the government clearly has argued that Rengan had some control over BCR prior to April 21, 2008.

The second -- the second chart, 24, my objection is the same: It's not just that I can prove, which I did, that Rengan regained control by April 21. It's that the government has argued that Rengan had control before then. And prior to my proving that by Bear Stearns and the loss be with it was the government's position I think that Rengan had some control over BCR much earlier, in fact, they didn't put in any proof about Rengan losing control. Without me, the jury would think that he had control the entire time over BCR.

So I think these charts as government exhibits are misleading. They're not just misleading, but they concern what the government has said are Rengan's trades. And I think your Honor's order was that Rengan's trades are not proof of

Rengan's participation in the conspiracy. And my memory of when we discussed this earlier was that the charts about Clearwire trading were not going to go back, so that's my objection.

I can hand these back to the government if they want to talk about.

MR. JACKSON: If what defense counsel just said is confusing, I think it's because it doesn't really make sense.

THE COURT: You can't have it both ways.

It's accurate, is it not, that it was only the defense that put in evidence that Rengan lost trading authority over his portion of the Buccaneer fund?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, your Honor, that's their theory.

MR. GITNER: Exactly.

MR. JACKSON: I'm not sure what that "exactly" refers to, but my only point, your Honor, is that there has clearly been --

THE COURT: So, if you take the opposite position, then these charts reflect Rengan's trading in Clearwire, which you may not argue from and you may not give the jury exhibits reflecting.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, we haven't taken the opposite position. We put evidence in that showed that BCR was his general trading code. They put in evidence showing that he was demoted during this time period, and we haven't contested that

evidence at all. So what this reflects is what is very relevant to the case: Galleon, Raj's activity in Clearwire throughout this time period.

The only reason that there's reason to believe that the BCR trade, which is the last one on here which is almost negligible, the 4/21 BCR trade of just 657 shares, the only reason there's reason to believe that trade is attributable to Rengan is because after proving up that Mr. Rengan Rajaratnam --

THE COURT: The BCR trades are going back, those are Rengan trades, right?

MR. JACKSON: No. The defense has --

THE COURT: Wait a second. Your exhibit?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, your Honor, but he has stated those are Raj's trades and we haven't contested that.

MR. GITNER: They actually did.

Mr. Jackson himself, in cross-examining Mr. Sito, who was the witness who testified about what happened, challenged his credibility, challenged his bias. Mr. Jackson himself did that. They have stated that.

And I have no burden. If I had sat here and done nothing, what would this chart say? And what if some juror on there decided to tune me out every time I spoke? That's the danger of this chart.

MR. JACKSON: That's a mischaracterization of what

happened with Mr. Sito. The fact that I cross-examined Mr. Sito does not mean that I ever said, and by the way no questions will be evidence anyway, but I never posed a question to him suggesting that this was actually Rengan's trading. We haven't contested that this was Raj's trade.

THE COURT: You didn't create this chart believing that Rengan had nothing to do with the purchase of Clearwire on March 24 and March 25.

MR. JACKSON: Judge --

THE COURT: Because there would be no purpose in your creating this chart this way unless you believed that this was his trade, not the block trade by Raj divided in three ways.

MR. JACKSON: No, your Honor, we respectfully disagree.

From our perspective, this is relevant to show what Galleon, what Raj was doing. Raj's trading in Clearwire throughout this time period is relevant in this case; and it's also admissible under your Honor's ruling, which speaks to the conspiracy in this case.

We have not contested their theory that this is all Raj's trading, but to excise from the case charts that reflect what was happening at Galleon that don't specifically reference Rengan trading, your Honor, will create an unfair depiction of what is going on, and what is going on in terms of Raj's trading is relevant. It's critical to the conspiracy.

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Trial 1 THE COURT: The jury wants Government Exhibits 514, 516 and 518. 2 3 (At 11:00 a.m., a note was received from the jury) 4 MR. GITNER: 514, 516 and 518? 5 THE COURT: Yes. Plus they want the charge. Can we 6 get that to them? Get it in. 7 MR. JACKSON: We're just waiting on defense to finalize the redactions on the disk. 8 9 MR. GITNER: I think they'll have all of them in just 10 a few moments. 11 MR. JACKSON: Just to put Government Exhibit 25 in its 12 context, far from smearing the defendant, this chart doesn't 13 even depict any profit being made in Buccaneer. 14 Even if you assumed, as defense is attempting to suggest, that the jury might construe this as some of Rengan's 15 16 trading, that portion of it is consistent with the defense 17 argument, but it doesn't, it doesn't in any way suggest that 18 Rengan was involved --19 THE COURT: Can we get them what you guys have agreed

to because they obviously want to get to work.

MR. JACKSON: Yes. We're just waiting for the process.

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THE COURT: I expected this to all be done, counsel. I really had.

MR. GITNER: We apologize, your Honor.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, to go back to the bottom line with regard to these charts --

THE COURT: Aren't there a lot of other exhibits?

MR. GITNER: I think we can send the paper exhibits

back.

MR. JACKSON: We have all of our recordings ready. We can send our recordings back and that will be responsive to request.

THE COURT: What's the problem?

MR. GITNER: There was a tape that apparently wasn't redacted the right way that the government noticed, so we had to redact it now and they're burning it right now. It's not like you can just cross it out. You have to sort of process that has to happen to redact it so it works. So we have somebody from Doer here doing it now and he's literally tapping as we speak. We can send back all of the paper exhibits and then the disk can go back in a few minutes.

MR. JACKSON: Perhaps we can start the set-up of the computer. If we can have permission -- I don't know if one of your law clerks want to do it or Ms. Hernandez can do it with instructions not to speak to the jury.

MS. HERNANDEZ: There are instructions.

MR. JACKSON: We can give the computer.

MR. GITNER: And the paper exhibits.

MR. JACKSON: They can start setting it up.

MR. GITNER: The disk will be on its way in a minute or two.

MR. JACKSON: May I say a quick couple of things about this. Your Honor's ruling, which the government completely understood and corresponded with by voluntarily removing all of those — we took it upon ourselves to make sure we removed from our submitted exhibits all of the exhibits that referenced Rengan's tradings. Your Honor's ruling was with respect to Clearwire trades done by Rengan Rajaratnam.

Now, it's the government's position that there is no evidence in the record, excepting what the defense put in, that identifies these as Rengan Rajaratnam's.

THE COURT: If the jury sees BCR, what thought process do you think they could go through and conclude that BCR does not mean Rengan?

MR. JACKSON: Because the defense spent a huge percentage of their case throughout the case emphasizing that Rengan Rajaratnam was demoted during this period; that these are Raj's trades.

Your Honor, we're left, if we have our exhibits which show the overall Galleon portfolio and what happened with Galleon --

THE COURT: You want to put a nice, red --

MR. JACKSON: Bar over 657?

THE COURT: No.

Do you want to put nice in writing "None of the trades on this exhibit are trades by Rengan"?

MR. JACKSON: If that's what they want, that's fine, your Honor. We'd be willing to redact the 657, but this is our only --

THE COURT: And what about the rest of them?

MR. JACKSON: Or we'd be willing to put that on there, but your Honor this is our only proof that shows what Raj was doing in the trades during Clearwire. It's critical proof.

It's not excluded by your Honor's ruling, so we should be allowed to put this in.

THE COURT: What if, in nice, big letters, there was a note: "This exhibit only reflects trades by Raj Rajaratnam, not Rengan Rajaratnam"?

MR. JACKSON: If that's what your Honor thinks is appropriate.

THE COURT: If that's your position if you agree that it should not be understood as reflecting trades by Rengan.

MR. GITNER: I appreciate that suggestion, Judge, but the problem is still that the 4/21 trade on Exhibit 24 is Rengan.

THE COURT: You said you'd take that out.

MR. GITNER: Okay. I'm not sure how we'd do that.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ JACKSON: We have technology that allows us to do that.

THE COURT: Even I might know how to do that.

MR. GITNER: Exhibit 25, the realized profit/loss would have to be changed because, as I understand it, that includes the BCR trade on the 21st.

MR. JACKSON: That's a negligible trade that would only increase the profitability of this period. If he wants us to redo the calculation and boost this number up from nine --

THE COURT: Look, it's the same time period by date.

MR. GITNER: I understand. The problem with 25 is it says realized profit and loss from date A, March 24 through date B, April 21. It's completely inaccurate if you include BCR at all because BCR also shorted that day.

MR. JACKSON: That's false because it says realized. There was no realized profit or loss from shorts that were enacted on that date. Mr. Callahan was very clear when he testified that he was aware during this time period, shorting activity wasn't reflected because it wasn't realized.

THE COURT: Look. I have my markup copy, which has lots of marks on it, and one of them was that the 4/21 leaves out a short of 145,000 shares.

MR. GITNER: Right.

MR. JACKSON: First of all, correct me if I'm wrong, but the shorting is not on 4/21. The short starts to take place subsequent to that.

THE COURT: That's not -- 145,000 on 4/21.

MR. JACKSON: But they're not realized. They're not covered.

THE COURT: They're shorts, but the point is that they --

MR. GITNER: That's the problem with 24, too. It says it goes through April 21. So, even if you take off the 21st, you have to completely change this and make it go through April 20, I suppose, or April 18. It's just an inaccurate chart. It's completely inaccurate and it concerns trades by Rengan and it shouldn't go in.

MR. JACKSON: I would just argue this is an unfair point for the defense to be raising this. We had the witness on the stand. He cross-examined him. We had taken away the charts that were inconsistent with your Honor's ruling, and now he wants to obscure the picture of what Raj was doing during the time period. The jury is entitled to know what Raj was doing during this time period. And if we put the footnote on this chart, Government 24, he should have no objection to these charts going in. He just wants the jury not to be able to see these Clearwire trades that Raj was doing.

MR. GITNER: It shouldn't be a footnote. It should be a watermark.

THE COURT: It's better and larger than the typing.

MR. GITNER: Exactly. What the government did here in their first chart, in their first Exhibit 24, they didn't break

out the way they broke it out here, which was produced on the eve of trial or right in the middle of trial. What these trades are on each day on the 24th and 25th and 26th, they're actually block trades like we discussed at the side bar, all made by Raj and then allocated into different accounts.

The reason the government decided to break them out this way is to make them look like they are three separate trades when, in fact, it's one trade at one time and the intranet data proves it. It then gets allocated into the different accounts.

So the whole chart is made to look like -- because at the time, the government thought Rengan ran BCR because they hadn't heard Mr. Sito -- to make it look like BCR, Rengan, was making these trades. That was essentially what they opened on and that was their theory. And even though now Mr. Jackson accepts that their theory was wrong, he never got up and said I'm wrong. He is just doing that now when the jury is not here. Again, the jury, just because he's accepting it there could be a juror or two or three that doesn't accept it, that tuned me out, whatever. They put this before the jury and now the jury is allowed to make whatever determination it wants.

This is misleading and the government put in evidence to make it look like Rengan did these trades, and now they want to send this chart back, which was devised to look like Rengan did these trades. So even with a big red thing attached to it,

I still think it's misleading.

MR. JACKSON: Nothing is devised to make it look like anything. The chart reflects what is in the OMS data. It doesn't make any suggestions beyond that. It doesn't say Rengan Rajaratnam on it. It refers to technology codes. It refers to portfolio manager codes. And Mr. Gitner's made his record about who was responsible for those.

Your Honor has excluded trades done by Rengan
Rajaratnam and told the jury not to consider those in terms of
proof. I would just point out one additional thing: The
defense introduced, again, a lot of evidence about what was
transpiring on the 21st, the 22nd and the 23rd during the
course of their case.

They made that stuff relevant to the case regardless of what -- after your Honor's ruling, they made that decision. So the idea that we need to excise that from the government's charts when that was a major portion of the defense, it doesn't even make sense. But more to the point, under the defense theory, these are Raj's charts. These are Raj's trades. They come in.

The defense's attempt to obscure the picture of what Raj was doing now, even beyond what Rengan was doing, is unfair. The jury should be able to see Raj made trades in Clearwire during this time period and that he profited from them.

THE COURT: If the 4/21 trade, the sell is out of 24, what is the impact on 25?

MR. JACKSON: I would have to do a little calculation just to know exactly what the 657 shares does to the picture, but I can tell you that the sale was 657 shares. We're talking about hundreds of dollars I would believe in terms of the alteration here.

MR. GITNER: It would be thousands.

MR. JACKSON: No, not in terms of the realized profitability. Maybe it's a couple thousand if that's what they want to argue, but it's certainly not a meaningful change to the number.

THE COURT: Wait a minute.

MR. GITNER: I don't want to interrupt.

THE COURT: I don't care if it's meaningful or not, but it's inconsistent with the ruling to have that trade on the chart and the chart was an advocacy document in the first place. It was never an attempt to be comprehensive.

MR. JACKSON: It was an attempt to be comprehensive about what the realized profit and loss was from trading in Clearwire at Galleon during the time period in question. And it accurately reflects what the realized profit and loss was from trading in Clearwire at Galleon associated with these portfolio manager codes was during this time period.

The defense wants us to put on here that none of this

stuff was Rengan Rajaratnam's, we'll put that on there. If the defense wants us to basically put that these are Raj's trades, we'll put that on there that these are Raj's trades. If the defense wants an additional note on Government Exhibit 25 that says this does not reflect, note, the \$8,600 loss in Buccaneer, you know, it's actually, you know, there's also a 657 share trade you should disregard, that's fine, but I think that would just be confusing unnecessarily.

It doesn't create any meaningful change in the chart and the chart is our only evidence that gives the jury a clear picture of how Raj was able to make money on Clearwire during this period.

We don't have the ability after Rule 29, after your Honor has made its decision, to recall our witnesses and redo the charts. This is the portion of the case that your Honor did not exclude, and so we should be able to retain that to the extent that it's not misleading.

We're not trying to do anything misleading. It's not dirtying up Rengan. It doesn't say Rengan. It says BCR and it notes the loss in BCR.

THE COURT: That argument is a loser.

The question is, if we're going to revise this to limit it, limit them both, clearly identified as only being Raj's trades, which we can certainly do by eliminating the 657 shares, that line can come out; and we can certainly have in

nice, bold type that this chart only reflects trades by Raj and does not reflect any trades by Rengan.

I can deal with that.

MR. GITNER: You also have to change the date at the top, but that's easy.

THE COURT: Right. Yes. We'll make it through 4/18. That we can do, but how do we deal with --

MR. JACKSON: We don't have to change the date if we're putting the note that says it only reflects Raj's trades because it reflects all of Raj's trades during that time period. It's just taking away --

MR. GITNER: It says Galleon portfolio manager codes.

MR. JACKSON: But the note is going to say that this chart is only reflecting Raj's trades, so if we redact the last one, if we redact the last trades, it reflects Raj's trades.

MR. GITNER: Why would you not agree?

MR. JACKSON: Judge, I'm just trying to not have this chart -- once we start making a million changes, we have more confusion.

THE COURT: Who is being confused? If there's no trade for 4/21, why would a juror be concerned about the heading at the top?

MR. JACKSON: Because we have our price chart reflects the time period, the subsequent chart Government Exhibit 25 reflects the time period.

THE COURT: But it wouldn't then, right, because the only trade on 4/21 is -- well, I don't know what it would do. I see what you mean, that if there would still be Buccaneer trades on 25 and if that -- well, I guess the question is what date does that go through? I don't know why it would go through 4/21, but the point is, how can the Buccaneer profit/loss number be adjusted properly?

MR. GITNER: It's actually exceedingly difficult to adjust because we have to determine we're going to have a FIFO determination, a LIFO determination. It's not necessarily so simple.

THE COURT: This is all short trading. This is no long gains.

MR. JACKSON: It's a short trade. You can look at the elements. Can we pull up the elements that are in now.

MR. GITNER: It's actually quite complicated from an accounting point of view about what exactly the profit or loss would be. It's not like these codes are -- you're buying at one time and you're selling at another time. They're buying and selling over time, and so when you sell on April 21, you don't necessarily know your profit. It's going to be like a weighted average. It's a very complicated formula to determine what the numbers were.

I could have crossed Mr. Callahan for quite some time, frankly, over his determination of these numbers. I chose not

to because I thought it was not necessarily the most relevant point in this case, but it is relevant to making the numbers accurate and it's not simple at all.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, we're talking about --

MR. GITNER: In fact, I made a motion on this, I don't know if your Honor recalls, about keeping profit numbers out because it was subject to opinions essentially about what the profit or loss could be based on very complicated transaction calculations.

MR. JACKSON: It's not that complicated. And your Honor, if now we're talking about the accuracy --

THE COURT: The issue he's raising is how do you match a trade on a certain day, the sell with the buy. Which buy are you allowed to match it against?

MR. JACKSON: Typically, we're talking about first, you know, we're talking about the last trade and the last sell, right?

Your Honor, let me just say this. Very respectfully, defense counsel is basically creating an issue out of an issue. Your Honor's determination right now that we should put on 24 something indicating this is all Raj's trading clears completely the ambiguity that they are concerned with. Now they're talking about or are concerned about the accuracy of the chart that's in 25 when 25 is already accurate. It reflects all of the realized profit and loss.

There's an artificial issue being created when they now say oh, but we need to take the 657 out because this is inaccurate. All that would happen if we take the 657 out is that this number goes up. It just goes up by either a couple of hundred or a couple thousand dollars. But it doesn't in any way -- if we're talking about what realistically could be perceived by the jury, it doesn't in any way affect the jury's determination as to anything with regard to Rengan Rajaratnam. We don't need to change this to the extent that it's already -- it is accurate; it reflects all of the realized profit and loss.

When we put on the previous exhibit the notation that your Honor instructed where it says "this is Raj's trading," that should cure their concern about ambiguity. The concern about the accuracy or the method utilized to calculate by Agent Callahan, that's far afield of what we should be addressing just when we're putting the exhibits into the jury room.

I'd also like to ask whether the defense has finished burning his disk.

MR. GITNER: It's on its way.

MR. JACKSON: I would request permission to send the government's disk back because --

MR. GITNER: No. We're having one disk. It's one disk with all of the calls. That was the agreement with Mr. Frey: One disk with all of the calls. That's what's

1 taking so long. It can't be two disks.

MR. JACKSON: It can be two disks. The agreement with Mr. Frey was contingent upon our expectation that they would have the appropriate stuff done.

MR. GITNER: No, no, no. This is not fair. We just happen to be the people doing it. It's not that we didn't have the appropriate stuff done.

THE COURT: Apparently, the government failed to redact some things that should have come off, so it has to be done again.

MR. JACKSON: No. The defense failed to redact. The defense failed to redact things that should have come off. Our disk with regard to our exhibits, everything is accurate. It's prepared.

MR. GITNER: The reason why we're having a delay now is because we had an understanding that it would be one disk. And then the government — I don't want to push blame on anybody, my team was under the impression from the government without going through me there should be two disks. Now we're just making one disk. It's happening right now. It should be ready at any moment.

THE COURT: Would you object if Mr. Gardner tried to help the jury start the computer.

MR. JACKSON: No objection?

MR. GITNER: No objection.

MR. JACKSON: I'll note for Mr. Gardner, the password is taped on to the computer. It's actually physically on the computer.

THE LAW CLERK: Okay.

MR. GITNER: We're literally putting the label on the disk right now.

THE COURT: And if the 657 shares sold at a profit, sold at loss? Forget the details.

MR. GITNER: You're asking a question, was it profit or loss?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I think we can clarify this. The last purchase of BCR in Clearwire occurs on 3/28 of 25,000 shares. Those are purchased at \$14.59.

The sale then, the 657 sale, to the extent that it comes out of that is at 13.39, about 1.20 difference on those 600 shares. And you can theorize that would be an additional loss of 657 times a dollar 20, which amounts to \$788. So, it's an additional loss if you include -- it's part of the loss calculation is \$788.

So to make this accurate, if we took that off of there, we would increase the number from 969 -- not accurate, I want to be clear, it's already accurate -- but if we were to change this to reflect what Mr. Gitner is asking for to take away this, it would change it from 969,114 to 969,902. The

number goes up to 969,902, which we're perfectly happy to do.

THE COURT: Could someone clue me in as to what is going on about this disk?

MR. GITNER: I'm not sure, Judge.

MR. FREY: We had prepared a disk of government admitted audio files that we understand that defense counsel was going to be preparing a defense version, a separate disk. We understand from speaking with counsel this morning that they would like to combine all of that onto one disk.

The problem is that there were a few calls where your Honor either had ruled portions come out for various reasons or defense counsel submitted portions and not the full version.

And my understanding is hat that wasn't done prior to this morning; the government's were, but not the defense side. So we're just working through the combining and the splicing issues.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, since the jury is clearly engaged in their deliberations and they requested it, there's no reason this all has to be on one disk. They can send in the defense disk when they finish with it and we can send in the government exhibit disk now which the jury has requested so the jury is not delayed at this point.

THE COURT: Is there any reason that we could not send the government's disk in now. When you get the combined, we'll trade out the disks?

MR. GITNER: I suppose we can do that. I think it's going to be ready I'm told in a few moments. It was ready but apparently they tried to write something over. One file didn't get written over, so it still existed.

MR. JACKSON: We've been waiting for more than a few moments. So we ask to send this stuff in and when they get their --

MR. GITNER: I understand the technical difficulties. I apologize. I think it's exceedingly unfair in this case to only send in the government's tapes even if just for a few minutes, and I understand there's been a note, but given the fact that what I have been told, it should be less than three minutes, we'll have the whole thing. It just seems exceedingly unfair to send in the government exhibits because Mr. Jackson is pushing, pushing, pushing as he's good at doing. We can just wait three minutes and the government will have it.

MR. JACKSON: I'm not pushing, okay. The jury has requested these exhibits. It's not exceedingly unfair. Being in courtrooms, we only send in what the jury has requested. And they're going to get the defense exhibits as soon as the defense pulls its tech together. So, we should send in what we have and allow the jury not to be impeded in their deliberations.

MR. GITNER: I'm told less than two minutes according to the clock on the computer.

THE COURT: Are we going to get to the government has to check whether it's accurate or not?

MR. FREY: Yes, we would want to check it.

THE COURT: Okay. The government will act extraordinarily quickly to confirm, no delays. I'm going to stay here and I'm going to watch you, but I think that we have to respect the jury and the government disk can go in and it's going to be taken right out as soon as the single disk is created.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Can we go back to Exhibit 24, put a nice huge header on it to clarify what it is and take out the 4/21 trade and the question is whether they -- if we also put on Exhibit 25 --

MR. JACKSON: Can we have one person from defense team on this issue really quickly, government Exhibit 25, your Honor.

THE COURT: Can we put a header on it. Instead of bothering to adjust the numbers, which might be more accurate, but is also immaterial by any definition of materiality, that to say that these reflect the realized profits and loss from trading by Raj.

MR. GITNER: I understand the materiality issue,

Judge, I fully appreciate it. My issue is that I do not want
in any way to suggest that anything that happened on April 21

is Raj. It's not. That's the problem.

April 21 is when the shorts occur, and your Honor will remember in argument in letters to your Honor, the government was arguing that there was no proof that Rengan directed those shorts. They have taken the position before this Court that that's not Rengan's shorts, and it wasn't until I had to point them to a few instant messages that they have sort of backed off. They have taken that position. It's not fair to suggest that what happened on the 21st is not Rengan.

THE COURT: Then can we agree that instead of the calculation being in accordance with GAAP or whatever other standard is utilized, that we do what is referred to as a back-of-the-envelope calculation like Mr. Jackson just did and adjust the numbers.

MR. GITNER: And move the date.

THE COURT: Move the date, adjust the number.

MR. JACKSON: If we move the date, how are we adjusting the number, your Honor?

THE COURT: Because when you take out the 4/21 trade, which is at a loss of a-dollar-something or other a share, it obviously comes out of both the Buccaneer number and the total.

MR. JACKSON: Okay.

THE COURT: That's how you do it. It's not that hard.

MR. JACKSON: So we'll just agree pursuant to stipulation of the parties that we're going to change

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Trial Government Exhibit 25 to reflect -- we'll change the Buccaneer 1 number by the \$788 and we'll change the date to April 18. 2 3 THE COURT: Right. 4 MR. GITNER: Right. 5 MR. JACKSON: Then we'll have the total number be \$969,902. 6 7 THE COURT: Since it's in the Buccaneer fund, you make 8 the adjustment. 9 MR. JACKSON: In the Buccaneer fund. 10 THE COURT: In the Buccaneer fund, and in the total. 11 MR. JACKSON: Great. I'm going to go make those 12 changes right now. 13 THE COURT: Show it to Mr. Gitner. I'll be upstairs 14 in case you need me. 15 MR. GITNER: They're doing the final check on the disk. 16 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. GITNER: Everything seems fine. We have a thumbs We need to look at it for two seconds. 19 up.

THE COURT: So we're going to trade out the disk right now.

MR. GITNER: Just so your Honor knows, what we propose to do, I think the government is fine with this. We each basically have an index, defense exhibits, their government exhibits, because the file name just says 510. The index says

the date and the participants. So we'll send in our respective indices as well with this disk if your Honor is okay with that.

THE COURT: Fine.

THE LAW CLERK: They need an extension chord.

MR. GITNER: That I don't have.

THE COURT: The Court has one.

MR. JACKSON: I'll also take a look and see if we have one.

THE COURT: Switch out the disk.

MR. GITNER: Should one of your clerks bring it in to swap it out?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Recess pending verdict)

(In open court; jury not present)

MR. JACKSON: Actually, I placed a copy on the judge's bench, as well as yours.

After conferring, the parties agree that we revert back to the original exhibits, but we would place this coversheet on Government Exhibit 24 that is in front of your Honor.

Just for the record, the coversheet says "The parties agree that the trading reflected in Government Exhibit 24 from March 24, 2008 through April 18, 2008 was caused by Raj Rajaratnam." So that's actually stapled now on the original Government Exhibit 24 and we're reverting back to the original

1 Government Exhibit 25.

Just to be clear, that's the Government Exhibit 24 that includes the April 21 BCR trade and the Government Exhibit 25 that comes to a total calculation of \$969,114.

MR. GITNER: So rather than have the header on the exhibit, the header is essentially on a coversheet essentially. The exhibit remains the same rather than altering the exhibit.

THE COURT: If it's agreeable to you, I don't have any objections.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you very much, Judge.

THE COURT: The only one that has to be swapped out is 24?

MR. JACKSON: I don't think we actually sent back 24 and 25.

MR. GITNER: That was my understanding. The folders were actually pulled.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I thought I got some word from my law clerk that there was a swapping issue.

MR. GITNER: I think the swapping was amongst me and the government.

MR. JACKSON: It was between ourselves.

THE COURT: So all that has to happen now is that 24 and 25 need to be given to the jury, and I assume your exhibits were in a card or box.

MR. JACKSON: Yes, we have them in the same format

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that the rest of the exhibits are. They're here in original
folders.

THE COURT: So we can just ask the court officer to add them. They're in a box, right?

MR. JACKSON: Yes. They're in a container of some kind. It may be a red well or a box, but this can be placed into it.

MR. GITNER: If the court officer can go and place it in obvious order.

THE COURT: Explain to the court officer what he should do.

MR. GITNER: My concern would be the court officer throws it on the table.

THE COURT: And highlights it.

MR. GITNER: Exactly. It should just be placed.

THE COURT: The collection was missing something.

MR. GITNER: Exactly.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, two housekeeping questions before we let the Court have its lunch.

THE COURT: It's much too early for my lunch.

MR. JACKSON: I know that sometimes judges instruct the parties that they can be away from the courthouse during the lunch hour. Is that your Honor's expectation?

THE COURT: No. I don't want you to starve, but we haven't even inquired of the jury as to whether they want

1 | lunch.

MR. JACKSON: Absolutely.

THE COURT: We'll probably not ask that question for about another 25 minutes, unless they contact us first. If they're eating lunch, it would probably be about 2:00. I don't have any reason to believe that they will necessarily stop talking just because they're eating, even if it's rude to talk with food in your mouth.

MR. JACKSON: We'll stay within the current range of the courthouse.

THE COURT: We have your cell. If you're in the cafeteria or something, we'll have no problem getting ahold of you.

MR. JACKSON: Great. That was the other thing I was going to pass up to your law clerk if it's permissible because I actually don't know if you have our cell numbers.

MR. GITNER: Chris gave it. Chris' handwriting is actually better than the typed version.

THE COURT: Just to let you know, we really won't be sitting past 4:30, 4:40 today, assuming all that time is used up.

MR. JACKSON: Absolutely. Thank you very much. (Recess pending verdict)

(In open court; jury not present)

E78GRAJ2 Verdict

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THE COURT: As we have been informed, we understand the jury has reached a verdict. I guess you'll stand for them. (At 2:34 p.m., jury present) THE COURT: Everyone may be seated. THE LAW CLERK: Will the jurors please answer present when your name is called. (Jury roll called; all present) THE LAW CLERK: Will the foreperson please rise. the jury agreed upon a verdict? THE FOREPERSON: Yes, we have.

THE LAW CLERK: The question on the verdict form Do you find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rajarengan Rajaratnam, also known as Rengan Rajaratnam, is guilty of conspiracy to commit insider trading?

How do you find, guilty or not guilty?

THE FOREPERSON: Not guilty.

THE LAW CLERK: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, listen to your verdict as it stands recorded.

On the question of whether the jury finds that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rajarengan Rajaratnam, also known as Rengan Rajaratnam, is quilty of conspiracy to commit insider trading, the jury finds the defendant not guilty.

Madam foreperson, is that the jury's verdict?

E78GRAJ2 Verdict

1	THE FOREPERSON: Yes, it is.
2	THE COURT: Is there a request to poll the jury?
3	MR. FREY: No, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Are we thanking the jury again for their
5	service or do we need to keep them any further?
6	MR. FREY: No, your Honor.
7	THE COURT: I understand that there's a request that I
8	speak with you.
9	THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
10	THE COURT: Could you just wait for me in the jury
11	room.
12	THE FOREPERSON: Should we all leave?
13	THE COURT: Yes. Just go and wait for me.
14	(Jury excused)
15	THE COURT: Is there anything else we need to cover?
16	MR. GITNER: I just ask that bail be extinguished.
17	THE COURT: Absolutely.
18	MR. GITNER: Thank you, your Honor.
19	THE COURT: You can still get back to Brazil for the
20	finals.
21	THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely.
22	MR. JACKSON: Thank you, your Honor.
23	MR. GITNER: Thank you, Judge.
24	(Adjourned)
25	